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HOLMAN V. COMMISSIONER: A DEATH KNELL FOR THE
TAX VALUE OF TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS IN FAMILY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS?
BRENT B. NICHOLSON
IN MEMORIAM
Professor Brent Nicholson passed away unexpectedly on December 4,
2010, at the age of 56. Professor Nicholson was a long-time faculty
member at Bowling Green State University having served on the faculty
since 1989. Professor Nicholson earned his Bachelor’s of Science in
Business Administration from Bowling Green State University in 1976 and
his Juris Doctorate from the Ohio State University in 1979, and he was
also a licensed Certified Public Accountant in the State of Ohio. Prior to
joining BGSU, Professor Nicholson practiced accounting and law for ten
years in Toledo, Ohio.
Over his career at BGSU, Professor Nicholson served the College of
Business Administration in a variety of roles including Chair of the
Department of Legal Studies, Inaugural Director of Entrepreneurship
Academic Programs and Associate Dean. He taught a variety of courses
in the College of Business Administration including classes in business
law and entrepreneurship and taxation. He was revered as an effective
and inspiring teacher, positively influencing the lives of thousands of
students.
Professor Nicholson received numerous honors and awards throughout
his academic career, including the Undergraduate Teaching Award in the
College of Business in 2002, the Undergraduate Student Government
Faculty Excellence Award in 1996 and 2002, and was twice nominated for
the University Master Teacher Award;
Brent was a beloved and well-respected colleague, passionate
educator, advisor, and true friend. He will truly be missed.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to add section
2703 in order to fortify the existing rules governing the use of the value set
in a buy-sell agreement, or a similar set of restrictions, for transfer tax
purposes.1 Although the case law in this area was not silent on the issue
prior to that time and, in fact, a Treasury Regulation had been in place on
the issue since 19582 and a Revenue Ruling since 1959,3 the perception
persisted in Congress that such agreements were being used to artificially
lower the estate and gift tax value of assets subject to such agreements or
restrictions.4 The concern was that taxpayers were using the agreements as
tax avoidance schemes by creating deeply discounted values for the assets
without a real business purpose and without loss of actual value or control
by the owners.5 Section 2703 required that a buy-sell agreement value be
disregarded unless it served a bona fide business purpose, was not a
testamentary scheme to pass the property to heirs for less than full value,
and was comparable to other similar arrangements made in arm’s length
transactions.6 Thus, section 2703 is of particular interest to owners of
closely held businesses and estate planners and their clients.
This Article examines a recent United States court of appeals case
concerning section 2703, Holman v. Commissioner,7 and some earlier
cases, including a few under the 1958 regulation, that are relevant to
Holman. The purpose of this Article is to explain the current state of the
law with respect to buy-sell type agreements and their influence on setting
the transfer tax value. The Article begins with a discussion of the relevant
Code and Regulations, focusing on section 2703 and its legislative history.
The Article then follows with a look at some of the relevant case law and
an in-depth look at Holman and ends with an analysis of the Holman
decision.

1

See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 2703, 104
Stat. 1388-498 (1990).
2
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (2010).
3
See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
4
See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
5
Id.
6
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 § 2703 (describing the general rule
and enumerating three exceptions). See generally Roger R. Fross, Estate Tax Valuation
Based on Book Value Buy-Sell Agreements, 49 TAX LAW 319 (1996) (providing
background on the law governing buy-sell agreement valuations).
7
601 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2010).
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I. CODE, REGULATIONS, AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2703
Section 2703 was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1990 and is,
in essence, a codification of Treasury Regulation 20.2031-2(h), rather than
its replacement.8 Its provisions apply to estate, gift, and generation
skipping taxes9 and it provides that valuations for purposes of those taxes
are not to take into account any “rights” or “restrictions” relating to the
property being valued.10 These rights or restrictions may be contained in a
variety of documents, including a partnership agreement, buy-sell
agreement, or the articles or bylaws of an entity.11 A covered right is a
right to acquire the property at less than fair market value, and a covered
8

Compare Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 §11602 (indicating that §
2703 is an amendment to the current Code), and § 2703 (discussing the requirements for
valuation and exceptions to those requirements), with Treas. Reg. § 20.2031(h) (2010)
(discussing valuation of securities for gift tax purposes); see also Estate of True v.
Comm’r, 390 F.3d 1210, 1231 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen Congress passed § 2703 … it
essentially codified the rules laid out in § 20.2031-2(h)); Estate of Gloeckner v. Comm’r,
152 F.3d 208, 214 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Since the 1990 Act for all intents and purposes
codifies this pre-existing regulatory language ….”). As mentioned in the Introduction, the
Internal Revenue Service had also weighed in on the topic with its guidance in Rev. Rul.
59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237. Section 8 of that Revenue Ruling states:
Frequently, in the valuation of closely held stock for estate and gift tax
purposes, it will be found that the stock is subject to an agreement
restricting its sale or transfer. Where shares of stock were acquired by a
decedent subject to an option reserved by the issuing corporation to
repurchase at a certain price, the option price is usually accepted as the
fair market value for estate tax purposes …. However, in such case the
option price is not determinative of fair market value for gift tax
purposes. Where the option, or buy and sell agreement, is the result of
voluntary action by the stockholders and is binding during the life as
well as at the death of the stockholders, such agreement may or may
not, depending on the circumstances of each case, fix the value for
estate tax purposes. However, such agreement is a factor to be
considered, with other relevant factors, in determining fair market
value. Where the stockholder is free to dispose of his shares during life
and the option is to become effective only upon his death, the fair
market value is not limited to the option price. It is always necessary to
consider the relationship of the parties, the relative number of shares
held by the decedent, and other material facts, to determine whether the
agreement represents a bonafide business arrangement or is a device to
pass the decedent’s shares to the natural objects of his bounty for less
than an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (internal citations omitted).
9
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(a)(1) (2010).
10
I.R.C. § 2703(a) (West 2003).
11
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(a)(3) (2010).
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restriction is any restriction on the sale or use of the property.12 Section
2703 is effective for agreements made or substantially modified after
October 8, 1990.13
Subsection (b) contains the criteria for an exception to the sweeping
language of section 2703(a). It provides that such rights or restrictions
may be taken into account if three conjunctive requirements are met:14 (1)
it is a “bona fide business arrangement;”15 (2) it is not a means to transfer
the property to one’s heirs for less than full and adequate consideration;16
and (3) the rights or restrictions are comparable to similar arm’s length
transactions.17 These three requirements are deemed met if non-family
members of the transferor own, directly or indirectly, more than 50
percent of the value of the property subject to the right or restriction.18
It is important to note for purposes of this Article that neither the Code
nor the Regulations provide a definition of the term “bona fide business
arrangement.”19 For some guidance on the meaning of that important term,
one must look to the legislative history of the provision and case law.
In the legislative history of section 2703, the Senate Finance
Committee acknowledged the potential for using buy-sell agreements to
create artificially low values for tax purposes, despite their usually
legitimate use.20 The intent of the legislation was to recognize buy-sell
agreements that were entered into for legitimate business purposes and
ignore those designed for tax avoidance.21 The legislation sought,
therefore, to disregard the buy-sell value unless it was of a kind that would
have been entered into by unrelated parties in an arm’s length
transaction.22
12

See id. § 25.2703-1(a)(2)(i) to (ii).
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 § 11602(e)(1)(A)(ii), 104 Stat. 1388419 (1990).
14
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(2) (2010).
15
I.R.C. § 2703(b)(1) (West 2003).
16
Id. at § 2703(b)(2).
17
Id. at § 2703(b)(1)-(3); Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(1)(i) to (iii) (2010).
18
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(3) (2010).
19
The term is not only used in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-508, § 2703, 104 Stat. 1388-498 (1990), but also in Treas. Reg. § 20.20312(h) (2010) and Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
20
136 CONG. REC. 30,540 (1990) (explanatory material concerning Committee on
Finance 1990 Reconciliation Submission pursuant to House Concurrent Resolution 310).
21
Id. “The committee believes that buy-sell agreements … generally are entered into
for legitimate business purposes that are not related to transfer tax consequences … the
committee establishes rules that attempt to distinguish between agreements designed to
avoid estate taxes and those with legitimate business agreements.” Id. At 30,539.
22
See id. at 30,541.
13
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The Finance Committee’s explanation also clarified several points.
First, the legislation applied to referenced restrictions that may be
contained in a variety of sources: a partnership agreement, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, or a separate document.23 Second, although the
legislation mirrors some of the language of Treasury Regulation 20.20312(h), the Committee emphasized that the “business purpose” and
“testamentary device” tests were separate and independent.24 The third
requirement of “comparable agreements” is a new test and, in essence,
means that the party must show that the right or restriction was an arm’s
length agreement.25 Relevant factors include: “the expected term of the
agreement, the present value of the property, its expected value at the time
of exercise, and the consideration offered ….”26 Isolated comparables are
not sufficient and expert testimony is acceptable.27 Where the business is
unique and comparables are difficult to locate, similar businesses may be
used.28 Finally, the Committee noted that the legislation did not affect the
present law requiring that the agreement be binding both during life and at
death.29
II. PRIOR DECISIONS RELEVANT TO SECTION 2703 AND HOLMAN
Because of the relative paucity of cases under section 2703 and the
similarity between the requirements of 2703(b) and Treasury Regulation
20.2031-2(h), an examination of a few of the relevant cases under the
Regulation as well as under section 2703 will be helpful in shedding some
light on the Holman decision.30 A discussion of some of the more
noteworthy cases follows.

23

See id. at 30,540.
See id.
25
See id. at 30,541.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See id.
30
In fact, Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-2(h) specifically refers the reader to § 2703
for agreements made after October 8, 1990. “See section 2703 and the regulations … of
this chapter for special rules involving options and agreements … entered into (or
substantially modified after) October 8, 1990.” Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (2010).
24
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A. Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner31
In the 1930s Bruno Bischoff and his brother-in-law, Frank Brockhorst,
formed two companies engaged in pork processing: Boar’s Head
Provisions Co. for processing, and Frank Brockhorst Co. for distribution.32
The two acquired a smaller pork processor, Weinkauff, in the 1940s.33
Ownership of the businesses was later expanded to include Bischoff and
Brockhorst’s children.34 In 1960, the Bischoff and Brockhorst families
transferred their ownership in Boar’s Head, Weinkauff, and two real estate
holding companies to an investment general partnership they collectively
owned.35 The general partnership was converted to a limited partnership,
F.B. Associates, in 1961, with Bruno Bischoff and Frank Brockhorst
serving as the general partners.36 A 1963 amended limited partnership
agreement contained stringent restrictions to prevent a partner from
transferring their interest outside the partnership in order to maintain
family control of the underlying businesses and provide continuity of
management.37 A similar arrangement for similar purposes was put in
place for the limited partnership that owned Frank Brockhorst Co., the
product distribution company.38 Both limited partnership agreements
contained a formula setting lifetime and at-death buyout prices, which
became the subject of a dispute with the Internal Revenue Service (the
Service).39 The Service sought to disregard the agreement price formulas
on the grounds that the restrictions served no bona fide business purpose
and were testamentary devices.40
The Tax Court determined that the partnership restrictions did serve a
legitimate business purpose and that the value of the interests for estate tax
purposes was the agreement price.41 Citing two Tax Court decisions and a
31

69 T.C. 32 (1977).
Id. at 34. Theodore Weiler was a third primary owner of the businesses. Id. The
court does not disclose his relationship to the other two owners. Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 35. The real estate holding companies owned the land and leased it to Boar’s
Head, Frank Brockhorst Co. and Weinkauff. Id.
36
Id. The remaining family members were limited partners. Id.
37
Id. at 35-36.
38
Id. at 37.
39
Id. at 36-37. In both limited partnerships the buyout price was the value of the
partner’s capital account with adjustments for income and withdrawals. Id.
40
Id. at 39. The Service, of course, contended that the actual fair market value of the
interests was considerably higher than the agreement price. Id.
41
Id. at 39-40.
32
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district court decision, the court determined that maintaining family
ownership and control was commonly recognized as a legitimate business
purpose.42 The court stated, “[w]e are convinced that the members of F. B.
Associates and Frank Brockhorst Co. entered into the respective partnership agreements in order to assure their continuing ability to carry on
their pork processing business without outside interference ….”43
Of greater interest, in light of the Holman decision, was the court’s
treatment of the Service’s contention that the restrictions, particularly
those in the F. B. Associates agreement, lacked a bona fide business
purpose because F. B. Associates was “merely a holding company” and
not an actively managed business.44 The court rejected this contention as
being “artificial and strained.”45 The court contended that to maintain
family control of the operating companies owned by F. B. Associates it
was necessary to restrict ownership in the limited partnership.46 The fact
that a partnership was inserted between the families and the operating
companies was irrelevant given the legitimate business purpose:
maintaining family control.47 The business purpose, coupled with the
binding nature of the restrictions during life and at death, made the
agreement price the date of death value for the partnership interests.48
B. St. Louis County Bank v. United States49
Although this Eighth Circuit decision pre-dates the enactment of
section 2703, it nonetheless bears on the decision in Holman because it
came from the same circuit and concerns the meaning of a “bona fide
business arrangement.”50 In this case, a decedent entered into a restrictive
stock purchase agreement with the other owners of a closely held moving
and storage company.51 The other shareholders were the decedent’s wife,

42

Id. (citing Estate of Reynolds v. Comm’r, 55 T.C. 172 (1970); Estate of Littick v.
Comm’r, 31 T.C. 181 (1958), Balt. Nat’l Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D.
Md. 1955)).
43
Estate of Bischoff, 69 T.C. at 40.
44
Id. at 41.
45
Id. at 40-41.
46
See id. at 41.
47
See id.
48
Id.
49
674 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1982).
50
Id. at 1210.
51
See id. at 1208.
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children, and trusts created by the decedent for his grandchildren.52 The
relevant portion of the purchase agreement provided that the deceased
owner of stock, or an owner wishing to transfer stock to a non-family
member, had to first offer the stock to the company or other
stockholders.53 If that option was not exercised, the stock could then be
sold outside the family.54 When the agreement was formed, the company
was in the moving and storage business,55 but it subsequently sold those
assets and thereafter rented real estate.56 The decedent died in 1976 and
the estate sought to use the purchase agreement formula price to set the
date of death value, which was zero.57 The Service objected that this
amount was less than book value, which the Service asserted was the
proper valuation.58 The taxpayers paid the deficiency and filed suit. At the
time of decedent’s death, approximately 80 percent of the company’s
assets were in cash.59
The appellate court, deciding the case under Treasury Regulation
20.2031-2(h), found that the stock purchase agreement had a bona fide
business purpose—maintaining family ownership and control.60 The court
disagreed with the district court’s grant of summary judgment, however,
due to the district court’s determination that a finding of a bona fide
business purpose automatically meant that the agreement was not a
testamentary device.61 The appellate court instead held that these tests
52

See id. Originally, Lee Sloan owned all the stock of the company except one share
owned by his wife. Id. He then gifted shares equally to his daughter, son-in-law, and
trusts for his three grandchildren. Id. The total shares owned by the children and trusts for
the grandchildren represented about 40 percent of the outstanding stock. Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1208-09. The purchase price was ten times the average annual earnings over
the previous five years, adjusted for gains and losses, less the tax consequences of the
gains or losses. Id.
55
Id. at 209.
56
Id.
57
See id. When the company was in the moving and storage business, the per share
price based on the agreement formula ranged from $597.00 to $1061.15. Id. That formula
yielded a per share price of zero when the operating assets were sold and it went into
rental real estate. Id.
58
Id. (noting that at the time of Sloan’s death the book value was $544.60 per share).
59
See id. (noting that out of the total assets of $256,000, $201,000 consisted of cash).
60
See id. at 1210 (citing Estate of Bischoff v. Comm’r, 69 T.C. 32 (1977); Estate of
Reynolds v. Comm’r, 55 T.C. 172 (1970); Slocum v. United States, 256 F.Supp.753
(S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
61
See id. at 1210 (internal citation omitted) (“Here, the District Court concluded that
the existence of a valid business purpose necessarily excluded the possibility that the
agreement was a tax-avoidance testamentary device …. We disagree.”).
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were independent—a view confirmed in the Regulations and legislative
history of section 270362—and that an agreement could have a bona fide
business purpose and still be a prohibited tax avoiding testamentary
device.63 Perhaps most significant, however, was the court’s finding that,
under appropriate circumstances, maintaining family ownership and
control of a passive business could be a bona fide business purpose.64
Despite its similarities, this case differs from Holman because, at the time
the agreement was made, the business was an active, operating one and the
stock was closely held.
C. Estate of Gloeckner v. Commissioner65
Estate of Gloeckner v. Commissioner is another case rendered under
Treasury Regulation 20.2031-2(h) that is nevertheless relevant to the
decisions under section 2703. This case notably did not involve family
members. The deceased, Frederick Gloeckner, was party to a redemptive
agreement with respect to his stock in Fred Gloeckner & Co.66 Gloeckner
was the majority owner and it was his wish that Joseph Simone own and
manage the business upon his death.67 The purchase agreement provided
that, at his death, the company was to redeem as much of Gloeckner’s
stock as was necessary to pay his estate tax in the event it had to purchase
all his stock, which was still not sufficient to pay the tax.68 It also
62

See Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(2) (2010) (“Each of the three requirements
described … must be independently satisfied ….”); 136 CONG. REC. 30,540 (1990)
(“[T]he bill clarifies that the business arrangement and device requirements are
independent tests.”).
63
St. Louis Cnty. Bank, 674 F.2d at 1210.
64
Id.
65
152 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1998).
66
See id. at 210. Gloeckner was a party to an original agreement with a minority
shareholder, Gustav Poesch, dating back to 1960. See id. The parties decided to revise the
agreement in 1987; however, Poesch, for unknown reasons, never signed the new
agreement. See id. at 211. He sold his stock to the company in 1988 so he was not
involved in the issues related to this litigation. See id.
67
Id. at 210. Simone was not related to Gloeckner and had worked at the company for
a number of years, eventually becoming an officer. See id. Gloeckner made two loans to
Simone totaling $175,000, one of which was interest free, the other of which carried
interest. See id. Both were secured by Simone’s home. Id. Otherwise, their relationship
was professional, rather than social. See id.
68
See id. at 211. Gloeckner left only collateral heirs at his death. See id. at 210. This
testamentary arrangement was thought to allow his heirs to inherit free of the estate tax,
and in cash instead of stock in a closely held business, in which they presumably had
little interest. See id. Simone inherited $40,000 cash plus all the common stock of Fred
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contained restrictions on lifetime transfers and gave the company first
rights to purchase Gloeckner’s stock during life or at death.69 Simone
owned only a small number of shares that had been gifted him by
Gloeckner and he signed a similar agreement.70 Outside appraisers were
used to fix the redemption price based on fair market value.71
There was no dispute that the price was fixed or determinable from the
agreement, that the estate was obligated to sell at that price, and that inter
vivos transfers were also required at the agreement price.72 Rather, the
issue in the case was whether the fourth requirement of Treasury
Regulation 20.2031-2(h) was met: did the agreement represent a bona fide
business arrangement and not a testamentary device to transfer shares to
the natural objects of the decedent’s bounty for less than adequate and full
consideration?73 The court quickly found the agreement constituted a bona
fide business arrangement because it was designed to “maintain current
managerial control.”74 Because Simone was not a family member and had
a professional relationship with the deceased, the court found Simone not
to be a “natural object of the decedent’s bounty.”75 Thus, because there
was a bona fide business arrangement and no evidence of a testamentary
device, the value fixed by the agreement was the value of the closely held
stock for estate tax purposes.

Gloeckner & Co. not redeemed. See id. at 211. The preferred stock went to a foundation.
See id. As mentioned in the text, the arrangement failed in the sense that, even though all
the stock was purchased, the estate still had to come up with about $1 million. See id.
69
See id. at 211.
70
See id.
71
See id. KPMG Benchmark fixed the value of Mr. Gloeckner’s shares at $440 per
share. Id. Simone’s shares were valued at $290 per share, presumably because of their
minority status. Id. When Gustav Poesch, also a minority shareholder, was bought out in
1988 he was paid $290 per share. Id.
72
See id. at 213.
73
See id. at 210.
74
Id. at 214 (citing St. Louis Cnty. Bank v. United States, 674 F.2d 1207, 1210
(1982) (managerial control by the family); Estate of Carpenter v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1274,1280 (1992) (managerial control by an unrelated business partner)).
75
Id. at 214. The court criticized the Tax Court for “jumping ahead” of matters by
determining that there was a “testamentary purpose” to the arrangement and then
proceeding to investigate whether there was adequate and full consideration. Id. The
court cautioned that, to give full effect to the regulatory language, it was necessary to first
determine if the intended beneficiary of the agreement was a “natural object of
decedent’s bounty.” Id. If they are not, the inquiry ended, as was the case here. See id.
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D. Estate of True v. Commissioner76
This Tenth Circuit decision, like Gloeckner, involved Treasury
Regulation 20.2031-2(h) and, in particular, the fourth prong of the
regulatory test: whether the agreement was a bona fide business agreement
and not a testamentary device to pass shares at less than full and adequate
consideration.77 Also, like Gloeckner, the Tax Court found a bona fide
business purpose existed for the agreements involved in the case: to ensure
family ownership and control of the enterprise.78 Under these facts, that
purpose aided in the goal of reinvesting profits to facilitate oil reserve
exploration and also facilitated enforcement of a policy of active
participation of family members in the work of the business because,
under the terms of the agreement, inactive members were required to
relinquish their interests.79 There is, however, an important distinction
between Gloeckner and True: True involved family members and
Gloeckner did not. Therefore, the Service did not contest the finding of a
bona fide business purpose on appeal.80
While acknowledging a lack of extensive precedent on the issue,81 the
appellate court found that the agreements in True did further a
testamentary purpose and were not for full and adequate consideration.82
As to the testamentary purpose issue, the court indicated that several
factors must be considered in that evaluation: the age and health of the
individual at the time he or she made the agreement; the enforcement or
lack of enforcement of the agreement in previous instances; the exclusion
of certain assets in the value calculation, for example, goodwill; whether
the price term was set arbitrarily or in consultation with professionals; the
76

390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 1218-19.
78
See id. at 1219.
79
See id.
80
See id.; see also supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (discussing the specifics
of the Gloeckner case).
81
True, 390 F.3d at 1220. The court said, “[W]e note there is not a wealth of cases
outlining the full process by which a court should examine whether a buy-sell agreement
satisfies the fourth prong of the price term control test.” Id. The court determined that the
“price term control test” was the test whereby the price term of a buy-sell agreement
would control for estate tax valuations if, (1) the price was fixed and determinable from
the agreement, (2) it was binding during life and at death, (3) it was legally binding and
enforceable, and (4) it served a bona fide business purpose and was not a testamentary
device to pass the decedent’s interests for less than adequate and full consideration. Id. at
1218. In True, the first three prongs were not in issue. See id. at 1218-20.
82
See id. at 1222.
77
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degree of negotiation between the parties; the allowance in the agreement
for adjustment of the price; and whether all parties were bound by the
agreement.83 The court also noted that agreements among family members
should be given a closer examination as they, of course, are more likely to
implicate a testamentary purpose and carry, in all likelihood, a greater
potential for mischief.84 The court further stated that under prior case
decisions this assessment, in essence, was an “arm’s length transaction”
test.85
The court found a testamentary purpose for a number of reasons: (1) a
lack of professional involvement in setting the strike price;86 (2) the
exclusion from the price of the value of intangible assets;87 (3) the lack of
a mechanism within the agreement for revising the price;88 (4) the lack of
negotiation among the parties to the agreement;89 and, most importantly to
the appeals court, (5) the complete disinheritance of an inactive family
member who was bought out, including disinheritance from assets not
covered by the restrictive agreement.90
The court upheld the Tax Court’s determination that the transfers were
for adequate and full consideration.91 Under the Tax Court’s analysis,
83

Id. at 1220.
Compare id. (citing Cameron W. Bommer Revocable Trust v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M.
(CCH) 346 (1997) (holding that for a buy-sell to control the date of death value it must be
binding both during life and at death); Estate of Lauder v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH)
1643 (1992)), with Gloeckner, supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (comparing a
similar case not involving family members).
85
See True, 390 F.3d at 1220 (citing to Dorn v. United States, 828 F.2d 177, 181 (3d
Cir. 1987); Bensel v. Comm’r, 36 B.T.A. 246, 252-53, aff’d, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938);
Estate of Littick v. Comm’r, 31 T.C. 181, 186 (1958); Estate of Godley, 79 T.C.M.
(CCH) 158, 164 (2000)). The taxpayers tried to argue that the legislative history of
section 2703 indicated that the requirement of an arm’s length transaction was a new
requirement of section 2703(b)(3). See id. at 1220-21 n.9. The court countered that, while
it was a new component of the statutory standard, it was a long established and still
viable part of the existing case law. See id.
86
See True, 390 F.3d at 1222 (the strike price is the required purchase/sale price).
87
See id. at 1222-23.
88
See id. at 1223.
89
See id. at 1224.
90
See id. (citing Estate of Godley v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. 158 (2000)). The Tenth
Circuit did concede that several factors militated against a finding of a testamentary
purpose. Id. at 1221 n.10. Those factors were the good health of the decedent at the time
the agreements were made, the previous enforcement of the agreements in the past, and
the binding nature of the agreements. Id. The court concluded, however, that the factors
noted above outweighed these considerations. Id.
91
See id. at 1234. In this portion of the opinion, after a lengthy review, the court
overruled its precedent in Broderick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955), to the extent
84
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which the court of appeals adopted, the court required consideration that
“would be agreed upon by persons with adverse interests dealing at arm’s
length. Under this standard, the formula price must bear a reasonable
relationship to the unrestricted fair market value of the stock in
question.”92 While the fair market value may appropriately consider
discounts for such factors as a lack of marketability or lack of liquidity, it
should not take into account discounts based on restrictions that have been
found to have a testamentary intent.93 In True, the agreement price was the
tax book value, while the fair market value, even after discounting for lack
of marketability, was considerably higher, undermining the taxpayer’s
argument that the agreement price represented adequate consideration.94
The court reviewed the Tax Court’s determinations for clear error and
found none.95
E. Smith v. United States96
This case is significant because it affirms that the law in effect prior to
the enactment of section 2703 continues to be in effect and the enactment
of section 2703 did not alter the requirements of pre-existing law.
The subject matter of the case included certain gifts of interests in a
family limited partnership made by Sidney E. Smith to his two children.97
The partnership owned all the stock of an operating company.98 Smith
made gifts to his children of limited partnership interests that totaled
approximately 20 percent each of the limited partnerships.99 The Service
it held that the price terms of a buy-sell were binding for estate tax purposes if the terms
were binding on the parties during life and at death. See id. at 1232.
92
Id. at 1234 (internal citation omitted).
93
See id. at 1234-35.
94
See id. at 1235. For one set of interests the difference between the two was $80.40
per share (fair market value) versus $38.69 per share (tax book value), and for another set
of interests the difference was $353,100 (fair market value) versus $54,653 (tax book
value). See id.
95
See id. at 1234 (“[W]e must now determine if the Tax Court clearly erred in holding
taxpayers failed to satisfy their burden of showing the agreements represented adequate
consideration. After reviewing the record, we conclude the answer to this question is
no.”).
96
No. 02-264, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24711 (W.D. Pa. July 22, 2005). The
Magistrate’s opinion in the case was affirmed by the district court in Smith v. United
States, No. 02-264, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20383, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2005).
97
Smith, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24711, at *2-3.
98
Id. The operating company was named Erie Navigation Company and had
previously been owned entirely by Mr. Smith. Id.
99
See id. at *17.
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disputed the value assigned those interests.100 The taxpayers sought to
reflect in their valuation the effect of a partnership restriction on the sale
of an interest.101 The Service argued that, due to the application of section
2703(a), such restriction should be ignored.102 The taxpayers countered
that the restriction should be honored as the agreement fell within the
exception outlined in section 2703(b).103
The federal magistrate hearing the case originally granted a partial
summary judgment in favor of the taxpayers on the issue of whether the
restriction was a bona fide business arrangement,104 but the magistrate
denied summary judgment because of disputes over material facts on the
issues of whether the agreement was a testamentary device and whether it
was comparable to similar arrangements (the second and third prongs of
the section 2703(b) test).105 After additional discovery, both parties refiled motions for summary judgment on these last two issues.
The magistrate, on the new cross-motions for summary judgment,
concluded that she did not need to address the last two requirements of the
exception.106 Citing to the Tax Court opinion in Blount v.
Commissioner,107 she reasoned that the law prior to the enactment of
section 2703 was not altered by that provision, and that under that preexisting law, an agreement or restriction “must be binding on the parties
both during life and after death” to be binding for valuation purposes.108
Here, Mr. Smith, prior to his death, owned two-thirds of the general
partnership interests and more than half of the limited partnership
100

See id. at *3-4.
See id. at *5-6.
102
See id. at *3-6. The restriction in question provided that on the purchase of a
partnership interest the partnership, or a purchasing partner, was to pay the price over a
term of up to fifteen years, determined by the purchaser, with interest in equal annual
installments. See id. The Smiths had valued the gifts at $1,025,392, the Service at
$1,828,598. Id. at *3.
103
See id. at *6-7.
104
The district court’s affirmation of the magistrate’s report is at Smith, No. 02-264,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20383, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2005).
105
See id.
106
Apparently, neither party had raised this issue. See id. at *11-12.
107
87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303, 1310 (2004) (“[A]s the legislative history makes clear,
section 2703 was intended to supplement, not supplant, the existing legal requirements:
‘The bill does not otherwise alter the requirements for giving weight to a buy-sell
agreement. For example, it leaves intact present law rules requiring that an agreement
have lifetime restrictions in order to be binding on death.”’). Blount, in turn, referenced
the legislative history of section 2703 at 136 CONG. REC. S15,683 (Oct. 18, 1990). A
discussion of the appellate court decision in Blount follows in the next Part of the Article.
108
Smith, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24711, at *12-13.
101
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interests, giving him control of the entity.109 He thus had the ability to
unilaterally change the terms of the restrictions during his lifetime. The
magistrate stated, “it has been held that the unilateral authority of the
transferor to alter the terms of a restrictive agreement during his lifetime
renders the agreement non-binding.”110 On that basis, the restrictions were
not to be taken into account in valuing the gifts.
F. Estate of Blount v. Commissioner111
George Blount, James Jennings, and the Blount Construction
Company entered into a stock purchase agreement in 1981 that required
Blount or Jennings to consent to the other’s transfer of stock and also
provided that the company would purchase the deceased’s stock at
death.112 The price was to be agreed upon by the parties or, if no
agreement, the stock’s book value controlled.113 Insurance was purchased
to fund the buyout.114 Valuations of the company stock were made
annually for an Employee Stock Ownership Program.115 Jennings died in
1996, and his shares were purchased from his estate based on book
value.116 Later in the year, Blount and the company revised the stock
purchase agreement to require a flat purchase price of $4 million for all of
Blount’s shares at his death.117 Experts for the taxpayer and the Service
disagreed about the total valuation of the company, of which Blount
109

Id. at *18-19 (“Mr. Smith … was able to unilaterally make all General Partner
decisions under the Smith FLP agreement …. Mr. Smith owned more than one half of the
limited partnership interests … thus enabling Mr. Smith to unilaterally give the ‘Consent
of the Limited Partners’ ….”).
110
Id. at *16.
111
428 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2005). The case is quite similar to Smith v. United States.
See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
112
See Blount, 428 F.3d at 1340. Blount Construction performed construction work
for public and private entities. Id. Blount and Jennings were the only shareholders. Id.
113
Id.
114
See id. This was done so that the company could still operate while honoring the
stock redemptions. Id. Three million dollars of insurance was purchased on each
shareholder. See id.
115
See id. As of January 1995, the total value of the company was about $7.9 million.
Id. The ESOP purchased stock from Blount, Jennings, or from new issues by the
company. See id.
116
See id. At his death Jennings owned 46 percent of the company and his estate
received just under $3 million for his shares. Id.
117
Id. The apparent impetus for the revision was Blount’s diagnosis of cancer with a
short time to live. He died less than a year after the agreement was revised. See id. at
1341.
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owned 83 percent at the time of his death.118 The pertinent issue was not
the various methods of valuation; it was whether the price set in the stock
purchase agreement was binding. The Tax Court and the court of appeals
both held that it was not.119 The Tax Court found that the agreement was
not binding during both life and at death and that it was not comparable to
similar arrangements.120
In the appellate court’s discussion of the case, it first determined that
section 2703 was applicable due to the substantial modification made to
the 1981 agreement in 1996.121 It then determined that the 1981 agreement
was not binding during life because, after Jennings’s death, the only
parties to the agreement were Blount and the company.122 Blount
controlled the company through his 83 percent stock ownership and his
role as the only director and president.123 He could thus easily modify the
agreement at any time and did modify it in 1996.124 To further buttress its
decision, the Tax Court found that the agreement was not comparable to
other similar agreements, and the appellate court did not find that
conclusion erroneous.125 The existence of a bona fide business purpose
and whether the agreement was a device to transfer assets to the natural
objects of the decedent’s bounty for less than full and adequate
consideration were not at issue in the case.126 The only solace for the
taxpayer in the case was the court’s overturning of the Tax Court’s
inclusion of insurance proceeds in making its valuation.127
118

See id. at 1341. The estate received the $4 million for his shares. Id.
See id. at 1346.
120
See Estate of Blount v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1303, 1312, 1316 (2004).
121
See Blount, 428 F.3d at 1343. Under the 1981 agreement, the total book value of
Blount Construction Company would have been $8.5 million. Id. Under the 1996
amendment, the total book value of the company was $4.8 million. Id. This difference,
along with a revision that prevented the company from paying the purchase price in
installments, and the elimination of a price adjustment feature caused the court to
conclude that the modifications were substantial. See id.
122
See id. at 1344.
123
Id.
124
See id. (“Blount essentially had the unilateral ability to modify the 1981 agreement
during his life, and, in fact, he did modify it during his life.”).
125
See id. The only expert for the taxpayer on this issue considered only price in his
evaluation of comparables and ignored $1.9 million in liquid assets, resulting in a
valuation that was $2 million less than other experts. See id.
126
See id. at 1342, 1344. Referring to the Tax Court’s analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
stated, that “the first two prongs of the test were not at issue.” Id. at 1344.
127
See id. at 1346 (“We conclude that such non-operating ‘assets’ should not be
included in the fair market valuation of a company where, as here, there is an enforceable
contractual obligation that offsets such assets.”).
119
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G. Estate of Amlie v. Commissioner128
This Tax Court Memorandum decision was the focus of some dispute
between the majority and the dissent in Holman and was decided based on
both pre-2703 law and section 2703.129 Because it is one of the few cases
under section 2703 prior to Holman and because of the disagreement
between the majority and dissent in Holman over its precedential value, it
warrants a more expansive discussion. Although the decision dealt with
several issues, this Article concerns itself with only those aspects of the
decision involving the effect of agreement restrictions on the estate
valuation.
Decedent Pearl Amlie left her estate to her children and
grandchildren.130 One child, Rod, was bequeathed certain bank stock in
which Mrs. Amlie had a minority interest (ultimately called First
American Bank Group, Ltd. or FABG),131 and he, his wife, and their
children were given rights of first refusal on shares of the bank stock not
passing by bequest to Rod.132 Approximately three years before Mrs.
Amlie’s death, her conservator (appointed several years before her death
because of her advanced age and her own concerns about her ability to
manage her finances) entered into a so-called 1995 Family Settlement
Agreement (FSA) with Mrs. Amlie’s children and grandchildren.133 This
agreement secured for Mrs. Amlie’s heirs, other than Rod, a fixed price
for the FABG stock of $118 per share.134 Rod thought that value too low
and thus the FSA provided that the bequest to him of the bank stock would
be transferred to him “in kind” and the stock so transferred would be

128

91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017 (2006).
Holman v. Comm’r, 601 F.3d 763, 778 (8th Cir. 2010) (Beam, J., dissenting); see
Amlie, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1024-25, 1028.
130
See Amlie, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1018-19.
131
See id.
132
See id. at 1019. The bequest was originally to Rod directly, but Mrs. Amlie’s will
was amended to name a trust for Rod and his family, The Rod Amlie Trust. Id. Rod’s
trust was bequeathed the amount of FABG shares equal to one half the value of certain
farmland that was given in equal shares to a sister and children of a deceased brother. Id.
Rod’s trust then had a right to purchase any remaining shares of FABG stock owned at
death by his mother. Id.
133
See id. at 1019, 1021. The agreement was between Mrs. Amlie’s daughter, the two
children of a deceased son, Rod Amlie, his wife, their children, and the trustees of the
Rod Amlie Trust. See id. at 1021, n.15. The conservator was not a signatory. See id. at
1024-25.
134
Id. at 1021.
129
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valued at that price.135 Further, his trust had the right to purchase the
remainder of Mrs. Amlie’s FABG stock at the $118 price after the
decedent’s death,136 and the estate could also require the trust to purchase
the stock (mutual put/call options).137 Because the conservator was acting
in a representative and fiduciary capacity with respect to Mrs. Amlie, the
agreement was submitted to, and received approval from, a state district
court.138 Two years after entering the FSA, Rod negotiated an agreement
with FABG for FABG to purchase the stock he acquired through bequest
and post-death purchase at $217.50 per share, plus 4 percent per year
appreciation.139
At Mrs. Amlie’s death in 1998, her estate recorded the value of the
bank stock for tax purposes at the $118 per share price fixed in the
agreement.140 The Service rejected that value and, instead, sought to value
the stock at the higher price negotiated by Rod with FABG for his FABG
stock, $217.50 per share.141 That was, in fact, the value at which the stock
was actually sold by Rod to FABG one month after her death.142 The
Service sought to disregard the FSA value under Treasury Regulation
20.2031-2(h) and section 2703.143 The reason for disregarding the FSA,
argued the Service, was that the agreement did not contain a fixed value
required by Treasury Regulation 20.2031-2(h) because the amount of
stock to be purchased by Rod (or his trust) was not knowable until after
decedent’s death.144 The court rejected this argument because the price
was fixed for whatever shares were part of the bequest (all of Mrs.
135

See id. at 1021. The agreement also prohibited the conservator from disposing of
the FABG stock without the consent of Rod, his wife, their children, and his trust. Id.
136
See id.
137
See id. at 1021.
138
See id. at 1022.
139
Id. These were referred to as the 1997 Agreements. Id. These agreements secured
for the Rod Amlie Family Trust a total price of $1,489,724.93 for all the FABG stock. Id.
The value of all the FABG stock at the $118 price was $993,756.96, the value reflected
on the estate tax return. Id. The Service contended that the higher value was the proper
one and assessed a deficiency based on the difference of $495,967.97. See id. at 1022-23.
140
See id. at 1021-22.
141
See id. at 1022-23. The Service also sought to impose penalties for fraud and
negligence under I.R.C. section 6662. See id. at 1023.
142
See id. at 1022.
143
See id. at 1024.
144
See id. The amount of FABG stock Rod was bequeathed was to equal one-half the
value of the farmland given to his sister and the children of his deceased brother,
respectively. See id. That value would not be determined until death. See id. The amount
of stock to be purchased was the total shares owned at death minus the shares
bequeathed. See id.
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Amlie’s FABG stock) and whatever shares were to be sold to Rod
thereafter.145 The court was satisfied that the price was fixed and
determinable at death, and the agreement was binding both during life and
at death.146
The court then turned its attention to section 2703. As to the first
requirement of subsection (b), the court found a valid business purpose for
the FSA agreement.147 The court stated, “[i]n our view, an agreement that
represents a fiduciary’s efforts to hedge the risk of the ward’s holdings
may serve a business purpose within the meaning of section 2703(b)(1). In
addition, planning for future liquidity needs of decedent’s estate … constitutes a business purpose under section 2703(b)(1).”148 To the Service’s
argument that no business purpose could be present because the object of
the agreement was an investment asset (closely held bank holding
company stock), not an actively managed business, the court said, “[w]e
rejected such an argument in Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner and find
it equally unpersuasive here.”149
The Service also argued that the agreement represented a testamentary
device because the decedent received no value for the 1995 agreement (the
decedent owned no more and no less stock than she did prior to the
agreement), and the price was less than what Rod was able to obtain in
1997—almost twice the value of the $118 agreement price.150 The court
rejected both arguments.151 As to the first, the court said that there was
consideration in the form of securing a set price on an otherwise variably
valued asset (and a minority interest at that) along with a reduction in
litigation risk, and that the other heirs also agreed to the price.152 As to the
second argument, the court stated, “[t]he conservator, in an effort to fulfill
145

See id. The 1995 FSA established a ceiling and floor on what the decedent would
receive for her FABG stock and transferred the risk of price fluctuations to Rod’s trust.
Id. It ended up benefiting him to the extent of about $500,000 (less capital gains taxes).
See id. at 1022.
146
See id. at 1025 (Referring to this as meeting “the pre-section-2703 requirements.”).
147
See id. at 1026.
148
Id.
149
See id. at 1026 (internal citation omitted); see discussion of Estate of Bischoff
supra at notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
150
Amlie, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1026-27.
151
See id.
152
See id. at 1026. In fact, at that juncture Rod’s interests and those of the other heirs
were adverse. See id. at 1027. The lower the price, the greater the number of shares that
would pass to Rod by bequest. Id. at 1026-27. The higher the price, the fewer shares
passing by bequest. See id. Because the other heirs were opting for a fixed price, it was in
their interest that it be at a higher value. See id.
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fiduciary obligations, and the other prospective heirs, in furtherance of
their own interests, accepted a price they believed (on the basis of
professional advice) was fair at the time and in the particular
circumstances.”153
The court also analyzed the requirement of comparable terms, again
finding for the estate.154 To support its contention that the terms of the
FSA were comparable to similar arrangements, the estate used the expert
testimony of an attorney, experienced in the purchase and sale of closely
held businesses, who contended that the 1995 FSA contained essentially
the same terms as an earlier agreement between the conservator and the
bank.155 The Service, pointing to Treasury Regulation 25.2703-1(b)(4),
said isolated comparables were not sufficient.156 The court dismissed this
assertion, holding that “[w]hile the regulations caution against using
‘isolated comparables,’ we believe that in context the regulations delineate
more of a safe harbor than an absolute requirement that multiple
comparables be shown.”157 The court was satisfied that this was an arm’s
length transaction, similar to what other parties would enter.158
Having thus found that the exception of 2703(b) was satisfied and that
the “pre-section 2703” requirements were met, the court determined that

153

Id. at 1027. This was certainly a case of the Service using twenty-twenty hindsight.
It was two years after the 1995 FSA before Rod was able to obtain the higher price. See
id. at 1026. The conservator and the other heirs valued the certainty of knowing the price
of the stock without further contest with FABG, whereas Rod was willing to stand by his
conviction that the $118 price was too low. See id. at 1021. He seemingly was correct,
but it is a stretch to argue that the conservator’s (and other heirs’) decision to accept the
security of a known price constituted a testamentary device on the part of the deceased.
As the court said, “the other prospective heirs and Rod simply disagreed regarding the
potential risks and rewards of further negotiation or litigation with FABG ….” Id. at
1027.
154
See id. at 1027.
155
See id. The earlier agreement, referred to as the 1994 Agreement, was a putative
agreement between Mrs. Amlie’s conservator and FABG for the purchase and sale of her
shares after her death at the $118 per share price. See id. at 1020. This was the agreement
Rod had objected to and which resulted in the 1995 FSA. See id. at 1021. Interestingly,
although the conservator entered expert testimony that the $118 price was fair, the 1994
Agreement was rejected by the district court as not being in Mrs. Amlie’s best interests.
Id. at 1020-21.
156
Id. at 1027. “Evidence of general business practice is not met by showing isolated
comparables.” Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(ii) (1992).
157
Amlie, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1027.
158
See id. “[O]n the facts of this case, we are persuaded that the 1995 FSA price terms
were arm’s length.” Id.
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the price term in the agreement was binding for estate tax valuation
purposes.159
III. THE HOLMAN160 DECISION
The Eighth Circuit announced the Holman decision on April 7,
2010.161 Although the court split on the decision, Holman represents a
complete victory for the Service on both the section 2703 issues and the
amount of allowable valuation discounts.
The taxpayer petitioners, Tom and Kim Holman, transferred publicly
traded stock in Dell, Inc. to a newly created family limited partnership as
part of their estate plan.162 The Holmans then gifted limited partnership
interests to their minor children who transferred, through a custodian,
previously owned shares to the partnership in exchange for additional
limited partnership interests.163 The Holmans filed gift tax returns for the
affected years (1999, 2000, and 2001) and claimed combined
marketability and minority discounts of approximately 49 percent, based
in part on restrictions contained in the partnership agreement.164 The
Service challenged the transactions as gifts of the underlying stock and not
of the limited partnership interests, and further claimed the restrictions in
the partnership agreement should not be considered under section
2703(a);165 therefore, the appropriate combined discount should be 28
percent (later lowered at trial to approximately 17-27 percent).166
While the partnership agreement provided for numerous purposes for
the entity, the petitioners themselves argued before the Tax Court that the
essential purposes of the partnership were to provide asset protection
(from dissipation by the children, creditors, or future spouses of the

159

Id. at 1028.
601 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2010).
161
See id.
162
See id. at 765. The professed estate planning goals were to transfer wealth,
preserve family wealth, avoid the dissipation of wealth by the children, and educate the
children about investments and the responsibility of wealth. See id. at 767. Notably, tax
reduction and tax avoidance were not explicitly mentioned. See id. The amount of Dell
stock held in the partnership represented about .28 percent of the total shares outstanding.
Id. at 767.
163
Id. at 765-66.
164
See id. at 766-67. The substantial discount was intended to also reflect a lack of
marketability and the fact that they were minority interests. See id. at 767. The discounts
were based on outside appraisals. See id.
165
See id. at 765-67.
166
See id.
160
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children) and wealth education for the children.167 Additionally, the
petitioners contended that, though they intended to diversify the
investment portfolio of the partnership in the future, they did not have an
overall investment strategy or plan for the partnership beyond the holding
of passive investments.168
The partnership agreement also contained several restrictions on the
transfer of partnership interests, which formed the basis for the amount of
the discounts taken on the tax returns. Section 9.1 of the agreement
prohibited a limited partner from withdrawing, assigning, or encumbering
a partnership interest except in accordance with agreement.169 Section 9.2
provided for certain permissible transfers within or for the benefit of the
family.170 Most significantly, section 9.3 allowed the partnership to:
(a) purchase, under specified terms, an interest transferred in violation of
the agreement; (b) assign this purchase right to a current partner;
(c) accept the transferee as a limited partner; or (d) refuse to accept the
transferee as a limited partner or purchase the interest, in which event the
transferee merely possesses the transferor’s right to distributions but has
no other rights as a limited partner.171
The Tax Court found that the Holmans’s gifts to their children were of
limited partnership interests, not of the underlying Dell stock.172 The court
did so largely based on the potential fluctuation of the stock value and the
consequent economic risk during the period between the formation of the
limited partnership and contribution of shares and the later date of transfer
167

See id. at 767.
Id. (“Neither donor [Tom or Kim Holman] claimed an intent to maintain Dell stock
as the sole asset of the partnership nor described any particular investment strategy …
other than a future intent to diversify the portfolio’s holdings. Neither donor claimed an
intent to hold anything other than passive investments in the partnership nor described
any business activity related to the partnership.”).
169
Id. at 766.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Holman v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 170, 185, 191 (2008). This analysis consumed a
considerable portion of the court’s opinion in the case. For a detailed discussion of the
Tax Court opinion, see Alden Koste, Note, The IRS Fished Its Wish: The Ability of
Section 2703 to Minimize Valuation Discounts Afforded to Family Limited Partnership
Interests in Holman v. Commissioner, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 289, 290 (2009) (“[T]his
Note delves into the Holman case and considers how the IRS successfully employed
section 2703(a).”), and Andrew T. Sullivan, Casenote, Transferring Wealth: Holman v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Retains Hope for the Family Limited Partnership
Despite Continuous Attacks by the IRS, 55 LOY. L. REV. 207 (2009) (“This Note focuses
on the Holman court’s discussion of acceptable methods to utilize an FLP to provide tax
savings for gift transfers through application of valuation discounts.”).
168
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of partnership interests.173 The Service did not contest this finding on
appeal.174
The Tax Court then analyzed the section 2703 issues, finding the
partnership agreement restrictions should not be considered in valuing the
partnership interests because the 2703(b) exception did not apply.175
Specifically, the court held that the agreement did not represent a bona
fide business arrangement and that the transactions were a testamentary
substitute, thus violating 2703(b)(1) and (2).176 In light of those determinations and the conjunctive nature of 2703(b), the Tax Court did not
address the applicability of 2703(b)(3).177 The court need not have
addressed the testamentary device issue under (b)(2), however, because its
decision held there was no bona fide business arrangement; thus, the
former issue was irrelevant. The Eighth Circuit, upholding the Tax Court
on the business arrangement prong of 2703(b) appropriately did not
address whether the arrangement was a testamentary substitute.178 The
remainder of the Tax Court decision dealt with the conflicting evidence of
the valuation discount experts; the court ultimately concluded those of the
Commissioner were more appropriate.179
At the appellate level, the taxpayers argued that the partnership
restrictions should be considered in the valuation determination, and
further that those valuations were considerably lower than those the Service proposed due to greater discounting.180 A majority of the appellate
panel disagreed, however, and sided with the Service.181
The circuit court majority found that the Holmans did not create a
bona fide business arrangement because the partnership was not in fact
173

Holman, 130 T.C. at 190-91. The court distinguished Shepherd v. Comm’r, 115
T.C. 376 (2000) and Senda v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2004-160, aff’d. 433 F.3d 1044 (8th
Cir. 2006) by stating, “[p]etitioners did not first transfer LP units to [the custodian and
trustee for the children] and then transfer Dell shares to the partnership, nor did they
simultaneously transfer Dell shares to the partnership and LP units to [the
custodian/trustee].” Holman, 130 T.C. at 186-87. The partnership was formed and stock
transferred on November 3, 1999, though the units were not transferred until November
8, 1999. Id.
174
See Holman, 601 F.3d at 765.
175
Holman, 130 T.C. at 191, 199.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 199 (noting that as the agreement failed the requirements of both 2703(b)(1)
and (2), the court saw no reason to address 2703(b)(3)).
178
Holman, 601 F.3d at 772-73 n.5.
179
Holman, 130 T.C. at 199, 216. This portion of the opinion will not be addressed in
this Article.
180
See Holman, 601 F.3d at 768.
181
See id. at 775.
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conducting any business.182 The court held that the Holmans had merely
altered their investments from highly liquid (publicly traded stock) to a
more illiquid limited partnership “container.”183 In reaching this
conclusion, the court made an important preliminary decision: the holding
of the Tax Court regarding whether this constituted a bona fide business
arrangement was a finding of fact subject to review for clear error only.184
The dissent took the majority to task on this point, but this preliminary
holding certainly made the job of the appellate court much easier.
The taxpayers argued the court was, in essence, imposing a
requirement that the partnership be an operating business; the court
insisted otherwise.185 While conceding some potential relevance, the court
also distinguished the Black, Murphy, and Schutt estate tax cases decided
under section 2036(a).186 Those cases also involved entities holding
passive investments. In this regard, quoting Erickson v. Commissioner, the
court said, “[t]here is no significant nontax purpose … where a family
limited partnership is just a vehicle for changing the form of the

182

Id. at 770 (“[I]n the present case, there was and is no ‘business,’ active or
otherwise.”).
183
See id. at 770-72 (“Here, as in Erickson, the family partnership is a ‘mere asset
container.’”).
184
See id. at 769 (citing Estate of True v. Comm’r, 390 F.3d 1210, 1218-19 (10th Cir.
2004); St. Louis Cnty. Bank v. United States, 674 F.2d 1207, 1210-11 (8th Cir. 1982)).
The court later states that “context matters such that it is appropriate to defer to the
reasoned judgment and fact-finding ability of the Tax Court” and referred to the
determination of a bona fide business arrangement as a “factually intense inquiry.” Id. at
772.
185
See id. at 769. The court said that neither it nor, as the taxpayers asserted, the Tax
Court sought to create an “operating business nexus” requirement to have a bona fide
business arrangement. Id. (internal citations omitted).
186
See id. at 771 (citing Estate of Black v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 15 (2009); Estate of
Murphy v. United States, No. 07-CV-1013, 2009 WL 3366099 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2009);
Estate of Schutt v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353 (2005)). I.R.C. section 2036(a)
generally includes in a gross estate of a decedent property which the decedent transferred,
but retained a lifetime right to possession, enjoyment, or income from the transferred
property. See id. at 771. An exception exists if the property was transferred in a bona fide
sale for adequate and full consideration. See id. Case law has deemed that provision to
contain a legitimate business purpose requirement. See id. The Black, Murphy, and Schutt
cases involved situations in which the retained assets were investment securities and the
restrictions were intended to preserve the investment strategy of the transferor. See id.
While the courts in those cases found a legitimate business purpose for the existence of
the partnership, the Tax Court in Schutt, as quoted in Holman, ruled “the mere holding of
an untraded portfolio of marketable securities weighs negatively in the assessment of
potential nontax benefits.” Id. at 771-72.
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investment in the assets, a mere asset container.”187 The court based its
conclusion of “no bona fide business arrangement” on the following facts:
(1) the only asset of the partnership was the Dell stock, and (2) no
concrete investment strategy or plan for the partnership existed other than
the passive holding of marketable securities.188 The court ruled the
prevention of asset dissipation by the children and their financial
education through the partnership were, likewise, not business purposes.189
The court of appeals also distinguished Amlie, a decision relied on
heavily by the dissent.190 Although the underlying asset in Amlie was an
investment asset (stock), the court found several distinguishing features. In
Amlie, the stock was a minority interest in a closely held business, while in
Holman the stock was of a publicly traded company.191 Further, in Amlie a
conservator with fiduciary duties represented the decedent prior to her
death.192 That conservator expressed concerns about the productivity of an
asset that represented a minority interest in a closely held business not
paying a dividend.193 This situation was obviously not present in Holman.
The taxpayers also argued that only the intentions of the parties, not
the nature of the assets in the partnership, were relevant;194 again, the court
disagreed.195 Context, the court said, mattered.196 The context that
mattered was that the partnership contained, and likely would only
contain, publicly traded securities, was a device to protect assets, and, in
all likelihood, would provide tax advantages during life and at death.197
There was, of course, nothing wrong with those functions, it just was not
something this court saw as a business.198 Having so decided, the court did
not find it necessary to examine either of the other prongs of 2703(b) and
187

See id. at 772.
See id. at 767, 772.
189
See id. at 772. The appellate court summarized the motivations of the Holmans as
“estate planning, tax reduction, wealth transference, protection against dissipation by the
children, and education for the children.” Id.
190
See id. at 770-71; 777-78 (Beam, J., dissenting) (citing Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r,
91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017 (2006)).
191
See id. at 770.
192
Id.
193
See id.
194
See id. at 769.
195
See id. Although the assets in the partnership were not relevant, the taxpayers
argued intent and the language of the restrictions were the only relevant factors. See id.
This appears rather self-serving.
196
Id. at 770.
197
See id.
198
See id. at 772.
188
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proceeded to analyze the appropriate amount of discounts to be applied.199
On that issue, it also deferred to the judgment of the Tax Court.200
IV. DISSENT
Judge Clarence Arlen Beam wrote a cogent dissent, finding that all
three prongs of the 2703(b) exception were satisfied and, thus, the
restrictions in the partnership agreement should be considered in the
transfer valuations.201
As mentioned earlier, Judge Beam also differed with his colleagues on
the standard of review.202 He conceded that the ultimate question of
whether there was a bona fide business arrangement was a factual one.203
He saw the issues in this case—however, as identifying the correct legal
criteria for that determination, as well as a question of statutory
interpretation—questions of law subject to de novo review by the
appellate court.204 It is, of course, interesting but highly speculative to
contemplate how Judge Beam would have ruled if he had accepted the
majority view on this issue.
As a matter of legislative intent, Judge Beam, citing a Joint Tax
Committee staff report, found that maintaining family control was a
legitimate business purpose, even if the assets under control were
investments.205 Further, he asserted that a Senate Finance Committee
report deemed family control of a limited partnership in a holding
company a legitimate business purpose.206 The Holman partnership
restrictions were thus consistent with that intent.207
199

See id. at 768-69, 773.
See id. at 775-76.
201
See id. at 776 (Beam, J., dissenting).
202
See id. at 776-77.
203
See id. at 776.
204
Id. at 776-77 (“[T]he fundamental question before us is whether the Tax Court
employed the correct criteria, framework, or test to make this factual determination ….
[W]e review the Tax Court’s statutory interpretations de novo.”).
205
See id. at 777 (citing STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 101st CONG., 2d
Sess., REPORT ON FEDERAL TRANSFER TAX CONSEQUENCES OF ESTATE FREEZES 14
(Comm. Print 1990)). In this regard Judge Beam criticized the majority for an unduly
narrow reading of Bischoff. See id. He read Congress’s citation of Estate of Bischoff as
endorsing the notion of maintaining family control as a legitimate business purpose
regardless of what constituted the underlying business. See id. The majority saw no
underlying business in this case. See id.
206
See id. (citing 136 CONG. REC. S15,680 (1990) (explanatory material concerning
Committee on Finance 1990 Reconciliation Submission pursuant to House Concurrent
200
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The dissent also quarreled with the majority’s differentiation of Amlie.
Judge Beam argued that the same portion of the Finance Committee
Report cited in support of the arrangement in Amlie supported the
arrangement in Holman.208 Because the lack of an actively managed
business was not fatal in Amlie, Judge Beam contended it should not be
fatal in the Holmans’s case.209 The only notable difference in the two
cases, the dissent argued, was that in Amlie the purpose of the restrictions
was to provide for future liquidity needs; whereas, in Holman it was to
protect against ownership by unrelated parties.210 As the Finance
Committee Report cited both as common uses of a buy-sell agreement,
Amlie was a proper precedent.211 However, something that is a “common
purpose” for a buy-sell agreement does not automatically make it a bona
fide business arrangement. As the majority mentioned, the Amlie situation
arguably required a value fixing apparatus due to the illiquid nature of the
assets involved there (closely held stock), a fact not present in Holman.212
As the majority also stated, context matters.213
The dissent also noted that it was a legitimate business purpose to
allow the partners discretion over the question of who may become a
partner.214 That function was part of the partnership restrictions as well.215
Finally, with respect to the business purpose issue, Judge Beam found
that the legislative intent of section 2703 was to prohibit primarily tax
motivated restrictions from creating artificially low asset valuations.216 In
Resolution 310); STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 101st CONG., 2d Sess.,
REPORT ON FEDERAL TRANSFER TAX CONSEQUENCES OF ESTATE FREEZES 14 n.44
(Comm. Print 1990)).
207
Id. at 777.
208
See id. at 778 (“[B]uy-sell agreements are commonly used to control the transfer of
ownership in a closely held business, to avoid expensive appraisals in determining
purchase price, to prevent the transfer to an unrelated party, to provide a market for the
equity interest, and to allow owners to plan for new liquidity needs in advance.”)
(emphasis in original).
209
Id. (“[I]f the absence of an ‘actively managed business interest’ was irrelevant in
Amlie, it is unclear why an actively managed business interest is required in the present
case ….”).
210
See id.
211
See id.
212
See id. at 770 (majority opinion).
213
Id.
214
See id. at 779 (Beam, J., dissenting) (without such restrictions, the dissent pointed
out, the Holmans as general partners could end up owing fiduciary duties to persons they
never contemplated).
215
See id. (referencing section 9.3 of the partnership agreement so provided).
216
See id.
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the present case, Judge Beam read the majority opinion to say that the
Holmans’s primary motivation for the partnership restrictions was to
prevent asset dissipation.217 Because the majority’s declared primary
purpose was not tax driven, the restrictions were bona fide business
arrangements under 2703(b)(1).218
Having so found, the dissent continued its analysis under the last two
prongs of 2703(b). The device test of (b)(2) was satisfied because the
“clear” language of the subsection made its application only relevant in
transfers at death, despite the Treasury Regulation making for a broader
application: applying it to the “natural objects of the transferor’s bounty”
rather than “members of the deceased’s family.”219 Because the
Regulation was in conflict with the language of the Code, it was invalid.220
The comparable terms test of (b)(3) was also met because the restrictions
found in the Holman agreement were typical of such agreements between
parties in an arm’s length transaction.221 As all three of the 2703(b) tests
were met, according to the dissent, the transfer restrictions must be taken
into account in the partnership interest valuation.222
V. ANALYSIS
The majority in Holman got it right. Had the dissent’s point of view
prevailed, there would be little left of Congress’s intent to curtail the use
of buy-sell agreements or similar kinds of restrictions as a mere tax
avoidance scheme. The arrangement was certainly not designed for a
business purpose. The Holmans took an inherently liquid, easily valued
217

Id. at 780. The appellate court, however, found the motivations to be “estate
planning, tax reduction, wealth transference, protection against dissipation by the
children, and education for the children.” See supra note 189.
218
See Holman, 601 F.3d at 780 (Beam, J., dissenting). Judge Beam summarized the
Holmans’s business purposes as maintaining family control over participation in the
partnership, maintaining control over the right to income, protection against creditors,
and control over who may become a partner. See id.
219
Id. at 781 (“It is clear that the phrase ‘members of the decedent’s family’
unambiguously limits § 2703(b)(2)’s application to transfers at death.”). Similar wording
to the phrase, “natural objects of the transferor’s bounty” found in Treas. Reg. 25. 27031(b)(1)(ii), can be found in Treas. Reg. 20. 2031-2(h) and Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B.
237, 244 (“natural objects of his bounty”). Judge Beam’s point, of course, is not the
language per se, but its use pursuant to the language of section 2703(b).
220
Holman, 601 F.3d at 781 (Beam, J., dissenting).
221
See id. at 781-82. The fact that the restrictions were typical of those found in
similar agreements was all that was necessary to satisfy the test according to the Tax
Court and Judge Beam. See id.
222
See id. at 782.
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asset and turned it into one that was illiquid and difficult to value. Why?
In all likelihood, to reduce the transfer tax cost. They sought the benefits
of retaining control of the Dell, Inc. stock, protection of the stock against
the claims of creditors or spouses of children, prevention of dissipation of
the stock by the children, and perhaps some wealth education of the
children; yet, they still retained the ability to have the stock valued for
transfer tax purposes at half its true value. Contrary to Judge Beam’s
attempts to portray it otherwise, the Holmans’s actions seem to be exactly
those that Congress sought to eliminate with its enactment of section 2703.
As indicated in Erickson, the Holmans merely changed the form of the
“asset container.”223 As stated in Schutt, “the mere holding of an untraded
portfolio of marketable securities weighs negatively in the assessment of
potential nontax benefits.”224
Judge Beam was somewhat misleading in his citation to the legislative
history of section 2703 contained in the Senate Finance Committee
Report. He cites the Report’s reference to Bischoff for the proposition that
perpetuation of family ownership is a legitimate business purpose even
when the form of business is a limited partnership interest.225 While the
Committee Report does refer to Bischoff on that point, it does so simply as
part of its exposition of what “a number of courts have held.”226 Further, it
should also be remembered that, while Bischoff involved two limited
partnerships, one owned an active, operating business, the other owned
stock in closely held operating companies, not an investment portfolio of
publically traded stock.227 The court in Bischoff may have rejected the
contention, in that case, that no bona fide business purpose could exist
with respect to a holding company, but it still found a business purpose in
partnership restrictions to maintain family control of several closely held
operating businesses.228 That is a distinctly different situation than that in
Holman.
The Amlie “precedent” was not much of a precedent. The surface
similarity is in the partnership’s holding of an investment asset. The
differences, however, are stark and significant. The stock in Amlie was
stock in a closely held business, the value of which was speculative.229 It
223

Erickson v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1175, 1181 (2007).
Estate of Schutt v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353, 1367 (2005).
225
See Holman, 601 F.3d at 777 (Beam, J., dissenting).
226
136 CONG. REC. 30,538 (1990) (explanatory material concerning Committee of
Finance 1990 Reconciliation Submission pursuant to House Concurrent Resolution 310).
227
See Estate of Bischoff v. Comm’r, 69 T.C. 32, 33-34 (1977).
228
See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
229
See supra notes 128-59 and accompanying text.
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was a minority interest in that closely held business, an inherently tenuous
position.230 The instigator of the agreement in Amlie was a fiduciary that
was discharging its fiduciary duties to protect the ward and decedent from
the vagaries of the position of a minority interest holder in a closely held
business.231 Finally, the participants in the Amlie agreement, in addition to
the conservator, were several family members, one of whom was at
decided odds with the others. None of those factors were present in
Holman.232 Thus, rather than precedent and legislative history supporting
the Holmans, the facts of Holman prove more consistent with the majority
opinion.
CONCLUSION
The Holman decision could be seen as a serious blow to taxpayers,
family limited partnerships, and the value of buy-sell agreements or like
restrictions. It is not such a decision, or, even if it is, it should not be
lamented. The Holmans “pushed the envelope” with their arrangement,
and they were appropriately called to account for it. While there are
certainly circumstances where a buy-sell agreement or similar restriction
with respect to investment assets should be honored for transfer tax
valuation purposes or discounted to reflect those restrictions, it is
stretching the boundaries of tax fairness too far to do so where the only
asset in the family “container” is passively held, publicly traded stock.
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See Amlie v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017, 1021 (2006).
See id.
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See supra notes 160-200 and accompanying text.
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